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Construction Law
by Brian J. Morrissey
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, the appellate courts of Georgia continued to
revisit certain issues that have displayed remarkable persistence in the
trial courts.
For example, there were a number of attempts to impose liability
directly against lenders on construction projects for the failure to insure
that payments were made to contractors in such a way as to avoid the
impositions of liens; however, the appellate courts failed to depart from
traditional notions that lenders are typically not responsible for such
failures.
Of particular significance during this survey period was the outline by
the court of appeals of a new doctrine perhaps imposing obligations upon
purchasers of products to look behind claims by sellers and manufacturers concerning the performance characteristics of those products.
Indeed, arguably, the court of appeals may have imposed an obligation
on at least a certain class of purchasers to duplicate test results
employing technical specifications rather than merely relying upon test
results performed by the seller or those in privity with it.
II.

LENDER DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

Disbursement of Funds. In De Coudreaux v. Mutual Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Atlanta,' the court of appeals addressed
whether duties to guarantee or inspect a construction project's progress
prior to the disbursement of loan proceeds existed. The plaintiffs
entered into a Construction Loan Agreement with Mutual Federal
* Principal in the firm of Richelo, Morrissey & Gould, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson
College (B.A. 1978); University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (J.D. with Honors, 1981).
Member, State Bars of Florida and Georgia.
1. 216 Ga. App. 503, 455 S.E.2d 88 (1995).
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Savings & Loan Association of Atlanta, Incorporated ("Lender") for the
construction of a new home. The Loan Agreement provided in pertinent
part:
[t]hat [Mutual] is authorized to disburse funds under its control in said
construction loan account, together with the net proceeds of the loan,
only in proportion to its inspector's report of progress or by Architect's
or Superintendent's
Certificate accompanied by a proper affidavit from
2
the contractor.

The plaintiffs contended that the Lender breached this provision of the
agreement by disbursing funds to the general contractor despite
knowledge of problems with the construction and further breached its
fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs by failing to monitor the quality of the
construction.3
The plaintiffs sued the contractor and the Lender, attempting either
to rescind the construction agreement or to have the Lender pay for
repair of certain defects.4 The Lender was granted summary judgment,
and the plaintiffs appealed.5
The plaintiffs contended that the Lender's actions were beyond that
of a conventional lender and, thus, created fiduciary and common law
duties flowing from the Loan Agreement to insure that the work
performed by the general contractor was workmanlike and to monitor
the progress of the construction.' The court reaffirmed the general rule
that an inspection performed by a lender on a construction project is
customarily only for the benefit of the lender, not the project owner,
except when the lender's activities extend beyond that of a conventional
construction lender.7 The exception to the general rule requires a
clear promise of the lender to perform certain protective functions, and
upon a clear and distinct participation in the activity which resulted
in the damage. It is certainly not enough to make general allegations
that the lender inspected the work, since such inspections are
presumed to be for its own financial purposes and are not intended to
insure a quality of work. The lender is not an insurer of the work of
the contractor, unless clear promises appear to the contrary8

2. Id. at 504, 455 S.E.2d at 89.
3. Id. at 504-05, 455 S.E.2d at 89-90.
4. Id. at 503-04, 455 S.E.2d at 89.
5. Id. at 504, 455 S.E.2d at 89.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 505, 455 S.E.2d at 90.
8. Id. at 504-05, 455 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Harden v. Akridge, 193 Ga. App. 736, 737,
389 S.E.2d 7 (1989)).
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The court found that inspections performed by two loan officers of the
Lender and the Lender's inspector and their correspondence about
various problems concerning the construction did not constitute activity
beyond that of a conventional lender.'
The court of appeals reached a similar result in Peterson v. First
Clayton Bank & TRust Co.10 In that case, Stovall Buildings Supplies,
Incorporated filed a complaint to foreclose a materialman's lien and to
collect on an open account for materials supplied for the construction of
a house owned by Robert and Gertrude Peterson. The Petersons filed a
third party complaint against the construction lender, First Clayton
Bank & Trust Company ["Lender"], alleging breach of contractual and
fiduciary duties in disbursing loan proceeds. The Petersons contended
that the Lender failed to insure that the builder paid subcontractors and
suppliers. 1 Summary judgment was granted to the Lender from which
appeal was taken. 2
The construction contract between the Petersons and the general
contractor provided that
the builder "[would] be required to furnish to the owner or bank
representative, upon request or at times of withdrawals, a statement
showing itemization of expenditures to date, items due and unpaid, and
to support said statement with receipted bills, affidavits, waivers of
liens, and other satisfactory evidence of payment." 3
The Petersons spoke several times with a bank loan officer who had
reviewed the construction contract. The loan officer acknowledged that
the Lender would handle disbursements, of payments to the contractor
and that the Lender would regularly inspect the property to monitor
progress of construction. The bank officer was aware that the Petersons
lived in Florida at the time and could not regularly inspect the
construction progress or handle payments to the builder. The loan

9. Id. at 505,455 S.E.2d at 90. For example, in Jordan v. Atlanta Neighborhood Hous.
Servs., 171 Ga. App. 467, 468, 320 S.E.2d 215, 216-17 (1984), in which there was found a
deviation from the normal activity of a conventional lender, the evidence established that

the lender had prepared the construction documents, listed the improvements to be made
to the property, solicited bids from the contractor, knew the home owner was looking to it
to assure proper performance of the work and provided assurances to the home owner that

deficiencies in the work would be corrected once payment was made,
10. 214 Ga. App. 94, 99, 447 S.E.2d 63, 67 (1994).
11. Id. at 94, 447 S.E.2d at 64.

12. Id. at 96, 447 S.E.2d at 65.
13. Id. at 94, 447 S.E.2d at 64.
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officer also indicated that she would inform the Petersons about the
progress of the work.' 4
The Construction Loan Agreement, executed on June 19, 1991,
provided in pertinent part:
Borrower authorizes and directs Lender to pay any loan proceeds due
under the terms of this agreement to [the builder]. Lender has no
liability or obligation in connection with the project or the construction
and completion thereof, except to advance loan proceeds as agreed in
this document. Lender is not obligated to inspect any improvements,
nor is it liable for the performance or default of any contractor or
subcontractor or for any failure to construct, complete, protect or insure
said improvements or for the payment of any costs or expenses
incurred in the project. Nothing, including without limitation any
disbursement or the delivery or acceptance of any document or
instrument, shall be construed as a representation or warranty on
Lender's part. Lender is not the agent or representative of the
Borrower, and the Borrower is not the agent or representative of the
Lender. This agreement does not reflect a partnership or joint venture
on the part of the parties and shall only serve to represent and
document the loan terms of Borrower's construction loan ....

Lender

reserves the right to require execution of any materialmen's lien
affidavits, or release of materialmen's lien affidavits by any contractor
or subcontractor or Borrower at any time during the term of this
agreement ....
The parties agree that the Lender may disburse the
proceeds of the loan to pay any expenses or liens incurred in connection

with the construction and completion of the single-family residence and
payment or performance of any obligation of Borrower to Lender, and
at its election, Lender may pay said proceeds to Borrower or to the
contractor or to any other persons furnishing labor, supplies or services
for construction of the residence or to the holder of any lien, charge or
encumbrance on the premises or other property securing the loan, and
the whole of such proceeds are hereby assigned, transferred and
pledged to Lender for such purposes .... 15

The builder failed to pay suppliers and subcontractors on the
construction project, and over $38,000 in liens accrued against the
property. The Petersons were not able to satisfy the liens and defaulted
under the terms of the Construction
Loan Agreement. The property was
16
subsequently foreclosed upon.
The Petersons argued on appeal that the commitments made by the
loan officer modified the Construction Loan Agreement despite the

14. Id. at 95, 447 S.E.2d at 64.
15. Id. at 95-96, 447 S.E.2d at 64-65.
16. Id. at 96, 447 S.E.2d at 65.
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express limitation of responsibility in that agreement. 7 The court of
appeals determined that the promises made by the loan officer amounted
to nothing more than promises to do what the Construction Loan
Agreement had already authorized through the language of the
agreement which allowed payment of proceeds to the builder. Nothing
in these promises conferred an obligation upon the Lender to insure that
subcontractors and materials suppliers were paid prior to disbursement
of proceeds to the builder." The court found that the implied conditions argued by the Petersons were not clearly within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of the making of the contract and, indeed, were
contradicted by the specific language of the Construction Loan Agreement itself. 9 Moreover, the Construction Loan Agreement did not
create duties from which tort responsibility flowed.2' The court found
that the Petersons' allegations of negligence were simple breaches of the
Loan Agreement, if anything, and were not breaches of duties imposed
by law under any statute or recognized common law principle. 2' The
court found no common law duty for a lender to obtain lien waivers or
payment affidavits or to otherwise insure that suppliers were paid before
disbursing funds to a builder, unless the lender's activities extended
beyond that of a conventional construction lender and the Lender
"engages ... in activities actually connected to construction of the
22
property."

III.
A

CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION AND BREACH

ContractFormation

Promoter's Liability. In Weir v. Kirby Construction Co.,23 Kirby
Construction brought suit against Weir for the remaining contract

17. Id. at 97, 447 S.E.2d at 66. O.C.G.A. § 13-4-4 pertaining to modification of
contracts provides as follows:
Where parties, in the course of the execution of a contract, depart from its terms
and pay or receive money under such departure, before either can recover for
failure to pursue the letter of the agreement, reasonable notice must be given to
the other of intention to rely on the exact terms of the agreement. The contract
will be suspended by the departure until such notice.
O.C.G.A. § 13-4-4 (1982).
18. 214 Ga. App. at 97, 447 S.E.2d at 66.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 99, 447 S.E.2d at 67.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 213 Ga. App. 832, 446 S.E.2d 186 (1994).
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balance for renovation of a "Patti Arbuckle's Restaurant." Weir entered
into the contract as President of Patti Arbuckle's Productions, Incorporated; however, a certificate of incorporation had not yet been issued by
the Secretary of State.24 As no certificate of incorporation had issued
as of the date of the contract, Kirby Construction brought suit against
Weir as the promotor, although there was no evidence that Weir had
actual knowledge that the certificate had not yet issued when he entered
into the contract. 25 Weir appealed from a jury verdict against him and
from the denial of his motion for directed verdict. 26 The court reversed
the trial court's judgment due to the fact Weir did not have actual
knowledge there was no corporation at the time he entered into the contract.27
B. Contract Construction
Modification Through Course of Business Dealings. In Barnes
& Tucker Co. u. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,' Alco Standard Corporation sued Westinghouse Electric Corporation for negligent repair work
on certain autotransformers.' 9 After Westinghouse moved for summary
judgment on the negligence claim because of the economic loss rule, Alco
added a claim for breach of implied warranty based upon Westinghouse's
alleged failure to repair and rewind the autotransformers in a skillful
and careful manner.30 Westinghouse amended its motion for summary
judgment by filing an Order Acknowledgment which Westinghouse had
sent Alco upon receipt of the transformers for repair. The Acknowledgment disclaimed any liability on the part of Westinghouse for breach of
any statutory warranty, express or implied, or for any economic loss for
work to be performed. On first appeal, the court of appeals reversed the
grant of summary judgment finding that issues of fact with respect to

24. Id. at 832-33, 446 S.E.2d at 186.
25. Id. at 833, 446 S.E.2d at 186.
26. Id. at 833, 446 S.E.2d at 187.
27. Id. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-23 formerly had provided that: "All persons who assume to act
as a corporation before the Secretary of State has issued the certificate of incorporation...
shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a
result thereof." The statute was repealed effective July 1, 1989, by enactment of O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-204 which provides: "All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation,
knowing there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for
all liabilities created while so acting." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204 (1994).
28. 216 Ga. App. 715, 455 S.E.2d 409 (1995).
29. Id. at 715, 455 S.E.2d at 410.
30. Id.
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the contract claim existed concerning whether the Acknowledgment ever
became a part of the contract between the parties.3'
On retrial, Barnes & Tucker Company was substituted as party
plaintiff. 2 On appeal, Barnes & Tucker contended that, absent any
evidence that Barnes & Tucker had explicitly accepted the Order
Acknowledgment as an amendment to the oral contract, the trial court
erred in submitting the issue to the jury.33 The court reaffirmed the
general rule concerning modification of contracts as follows:
[elven if the contract provides it may not be changed except by writing,
parties may subsequently by mutual consent enter into a new
agreement at variance with the other. The modified agreement need
not be expressed in words, in writing or signed, but the
parties must
34
manifest their intent to modify the original contract.
Westinghouse had introduced evidence that, through a course of business
dealings over the years between the parties and circumstances under
which the contract was formed, the Order Acknowledgment had been
accepted by Barnes & Tucker as a part of the agreement.35
Implied Contracts. In Owens u. Landscape Perfections, Inc.,36 the
court of appeals considered whether the existence of an express oral
agreement between owner and contractor precluded the contractor from
recovering in quantum meruit.3 7 The parties had a previous contractual relationship under which Landscape Perfections performed construction services at the former home of the plaintiffs, Steve and Jean Owens.
In 1989, the Owens contacted Landscape Perfections for services in
preparation for the construction of a new home.3 8 The president of
Landscape Perfections met with the Owens on several occasions, flagging
trees which were to remain on the property and taking measurements
in preparation for the landscaping plan. The plan was presented with
a written proposal to Steve Owens, including the total cost for the
services. The proposal was never signed or returned by the Owens.39
Steve Owens verbally agreed to the price contained in the proposal and
informed Landscape Perfections to proceed with the project. When the

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 715-16, 455 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 716, 455 S.E.2d at 410.
Id.
Id. at 717, 455 S.E.2d at 411.

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

215 Ga. App. 642, 451 S.E.2d 495 (1994).
Id. at 643, 451 S.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 642, 451 S.E.2d at 495.
Id., 451 S.E.2d at 495-96.
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Owens failed to pay for the services despite demand, Landscape
Perfections commenced a suit in quantum meruit. 0
At trial, Landscape Perfections offered evidence concerning the
reasonable value of the services. 4 ' The court held that when one
renders valuable services to another, and the latter accepts, an implied
promise to pay a reasonable value is created.4 2 The Owens argued that
"[there cannot be an express and implied contract for the same thing
existing at the same time between the same parties."43 But the court
found there to be no express oral agreement between the Owens and
Landscape Perfections for the services rendered. The express oral
agreement between the Owens and Landscape Perfections did not
establish definite terms upon which the corporation would be paid;
therefore, this term could be implied for those services rendered at a
reasonable value."
Incorporation of Performance Specifications. The court of
appeals in Cobb County School District v. MAT Factory, Inc. 45 considered a number of issues relating to contract, fraud and warranty
claims.46 On June 6, 1991, Cobb County School District and Leisure
Lines, Incorporated entered into a contract obligating Leisure Lines to
complete playground resurfacing at Blackwell Elementary School for a
total cost of $24,990. 4' The AIA Agreement contained an "entirety"
clause enumerating the contract documents comprising all of the terms
and conditions of the agreement. These included contract specifications
which specified playground covering material composed of wood fiber or
chips and required the bidder to meet the surface depth requirements of
the Consumer Products Safety Commission Technical Guidelines under
ASTM and ANSI specifications.48
Leisure Lines contracted with MAT Factory, a California corporation,
the distributor of a plastic-type product called "Safety Deck" manufactured in New Zealand by Versatile Plastic Recyclers. The Safety Deck

40. Id. at 643, 451 S.E.2d at 496.

41. Id.
42.

Id; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7 (1982).

43.

215 Ga. App. at 643,451 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Venture Construction Co. v. Great

American Mtg. Investors, 134 Ga. App. 440, 214 S.E.2d 683 (1975)).

44.

215 Ga. App. at 643, 451 S.E.2d at 496.

45.

215 Ga. App. 697, 452 S.E.2d 140 (1994).

46. Id. at 697, 452 S.E.2d at 142.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 697-98, 698 n.1, 452 S.E.2d at 142, 142 n.1 ("ASTM is the American Society
for Testing Materials and ANSI is the American National Standards Institute").
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was installed with the knowledge and consent of Cobb County School
District at Blackwell Elementary School.49
Subsequent to this installation, on July 15, 1991, the Director of
Planning of the Cobb County School District sent a memo to the Director
of Support Services attaching a copy of ASTM Designation F1292-91, the
standard specification for impact attenuation of surface systems for
playground equipment. The memo attached a copy of the June 18, 1990
test results performed on Safety Deck by Northwest Laboratories.50
The Northwest Laboratories' test report indicated that impact attenuation was measured in accordance with proposed ASTM standard F8-52.
The Northwest Laboratories' test results and MAT Factory promotional
literature indicating safe fall height parameters had been provided by
Leisure Lines to Cobb County School District on November 9, 1990, eight
months prior to the Blackwell Elementary School contract. 5' The memo
of the Director of Planning was forwarded to Leisure Lines requesting
that Leisure Lines furnish updated test results showing compliance with
ASTM Designation F1292-91. The memo explicitly indicated that
without a representation that the testing had been done in accordance
with the new ASTM standard, the Director of Planning would recommend no further purchases of the material.5 2
The memo was forwarded by Leisure Lines to MAT Factory for
response, which was provided on July 23, 1991, by the president of MAT
Factory. The president of MAT Factory indicated that the tests
performed under proposed standard F8-52 were in compliance with the
standard specification carrying the permanent ASTM Designation
F1292-91.53 Upon receipt of this letter, the Director of Planning sent
a memo to the Director of Support Services referring to this representation stating that the test performed was in compliance with the ASTM
specification and withdrew his opposition to making additional
purchases of the product.'
While the proposed standard F8-52 was a committee designation and
was ultimately used as the standard, it was finalized into the permanent
ASTM Designation F1292-91 with one major difference: temperature

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 698, 452 S.E.2d at 143.
Id.
Id. at 698, 700, 452 S.E.2d at 143-44.
Id. at 699, 452 S.E.2d at 143.

53. Id.
54. Id.
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controls were required for in-laboratory testing, but not for site testing.55
On December 3, 1991, a letter of contract was issued by the School
District to Leisure Lines to supply Safetytred playground servicing for
nine elementary schools in accordance with the proposal dated October
16, 1991 for a total price of $194,415.56 There were no performance
specifications included in or alluded to in this letter contract. Leisure
Lines placed an order with MAT Factory on January 6, 1992 but
canceled that order on January 17, purchasing instead "Gras-Gard" from
Pawling Corporation of New York. Delivery of "Gras-Gard" was accepted
by Cobb County School District until September 24, 1992, when Leisure
Lines received a letter from Cobb County School District indicating the
product was "non-conforming" and stating it was no longer wanted.57
Prior to that notice, on September 11, 1992, Cobb County School
District had Northwest Laboratories perform the same on-site tests on
the Blackwell Elementary School installation as had previously been
done by MAT Factory in California.5" The 1990 test results provided
by MAT Factory to Leisure Lines, and subsequently to Cobb County
School District, reflected a maximum "safe fall" height of 7.45 feet on the
first test and 8.5 feet on the second. The test performed at Blackwell
Elementary showed maximum safe fall heights of only 4 to 6 feet. 59
Although the 1990 test report indicated that "[tihe [volleyball] court was
in a very wet condition because it had recently been irrigated[,"8 ° the
promotional materials obtained from MAT Factory using the 1990 test
data indicated that Safety Deck's high test results showed a safe fall
height of almost 9 feet which minimized risks of injury to children on
playgrounds.6 1
Cobb County School District brought suit against Leisure Lines for
fraud, breach of contract and breach of warranty and against MAT
Factory for fraud and breach of warranty. The trial court entered

55. Id. The court of appeals does not discuss what significance this difference could
make with respect to reliability of test results performed in an uncontrolled environment
or representations made incorporating those results. Indeed, there is no discussion
concerning the differences between the type of controls used in a laboratory setting as
opposed to site testing where differing environmental factors may affect results
unbeknownst to the purchaser. See id.
56. Id. at 698 n.2, 452 S.E.2d at 143 n.2. ("'Safetytred' was the name given to the
product by Verstile. MAT [Factory] registered that name as well as 'Safety Deck' with the
patent and trademark office for marketing purposes. It is the same product.").
57. Id. at 700, 452 S.E.2d at 144.
58. Id. There is no discussion by the court of appeals about why Cobb County School
District chose to duplicate these tests on that date.
59. 215 Ga. App. at 700, 452 S.E.2d at 144.
60. Id. at 700 n.4, 452 S.E.2d at 144 n.4.
61. Id. at 700, 452 S.E.2d at 144.
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summary judgment against Cobb County School District from which it
appealed.62
With respect to the contract claims against Leisure Lines, the court of
appeals found that the first contract relating to Blackwell Elementary
School did not include any mandatory safe fall height.6 3 There was no
discussion, however, whether the ANSI and ASTM standards relating to
impact attenuation and safe fall heights, incorporated by reference into
the contract in the specifications, would have imposed any mandatory
safe fall height requirement on the product chosen. With respect to the
second contract, the "Gras-Gard", being a trade name for Safetytred, the
same product as MAT Factory's Safety Deck, was a suitable substitute.
The contract was not breached because it contained no performance
specifications whatsoever, and, upon delivery, Leisure Lines fully
performed its obligations."
Breach of Warranties. With respect to the warranty claims, in
Cobb County School District v. MAT Factory,Inc.,65 the court of appeals
considered express and implied warranties of merchantability under
Georgia's Commercial Code.66 The warranty of merchantability only
runs to those parties in direct privity with the seller.67 With respect to
the breach of warranty claim against Leisure Lines as the seller,
rejection of the product in September 1992 after installation in June
1991 and delivery of the second shipment in early 1992 was not within
a reasonable time after tender and delivery as a matter of law.6" It is
not clear from the language of the opinion whether 8 months is
unreasonable as a matter of law or simply unreasonable in light of the
facts in this case, particularly in light of the court's finding that Cobb
County School District could not have justifiably relied upon the test
results in representations and promotional material as the basis for
fraud.69

62.
63.

Id. at 697, 452 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 701, 452 S.E.2d at 145.

64. Id. at 702, 452 S.E.2d at 145.
65. See supra note 45.
66. 215 Ga. App. at 702, 452 S.E.2d at 145.
67. Id. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318 limits the scope of third party beneficiaries of warranties
to natural persons. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318 (1994).
68. 215 Ga. App. at 702-03, 452 S.E.2d at 146.
69. See infra notes 95-98.
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C. Breach and Remedies
Limitation of Actions. During the survey period, the court of
appeals had two occasions to address the meaning of the statute of
repose governing construction claims.7" In Hanna v. McWilliams,7
plaintiffs Joseph and Annastasia Hanna brought suit for damages to real
and personal property against Steve McWilliams d/b/a McTee &
Associates and Ace Fireplace Sales, Incorporated.72 On June 13, 1992,
plaintiff's house caught fire. The Hannas contended the fire was caused
by a latent fireplace defect. The fireplace had been installed on March
19, 1984. The fireplace was sold by Ace Fireplace to McWilliams, who
was sent a final bill on April 17, 1984. McWilliams testified that the
substantial completion date on the house was on or before July 31, 1984.
The Hannas contended the house was substantially completed no earlier
than August 14, 1984, when the Certificate of Occupancy was issued.
The Hannas took possession of the house on October 5, 1984. 73
The suit was filed on August 7, 1992 for negligent construction.
Summary judgment was granted by the trial court against the Hannas
74
because the suit was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

70. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 provides as follows:
(a) No action to recover damages:
(1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design, specifications,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to
real property;
(2) For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; or
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the survey
or plat, design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion
of such an improvement.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, in the case of such an
injury to property or the person or such injury causing wrongful death, which
injury occurred during the seventh or eighth year after such substantial
completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful
death may be brought within two years after the date on which such injury
occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be
brought more than ten years after the substantial completion of construction of
such an improvement.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 (1982).
71.

213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994).

72. Id. at 648, 446 S.E.2d at 742.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The Hannas first contended that operation of the "discovery of defects"
rule should delay the accrual of a right of action until the damage to
realty occurred on June 13, 1992. The "discovery" rule, however, does
not extend to property damage, but only to cases of bodily injury.75
Moreover, the discovery rule does not apply to the eight-year statute of
repose which begins to76run after substantial completion of the improvement to real property.
The applicable statute of limitations governing damage to realty has
been construed to mean that suit must be brought within four years
after substantial completion. 77 Thus, the claim from this damage was
time-barred.7" With respect to the claim for damage to personalty,
although the statute provides that the limitation period does not begin
to run until injury is sustained,79 the application of the statute of
repose barred the claim, The court found that the statute of repose
did not establish an eight-year statute of limitation, but an outer time
limit only which commenced upon substantial completion of the
improvement to realty. Both of these previously existing statutes of
limitation governing the claims brought continued to operate, but within
this outer parameter."
The statute of repose applies regardless of when injury occurs or
whether a cause of action has even accrued at all prior to the expiration
of the eight-year time period. Indeed, the court reiterated that the
statute of repose can commence to run against an injured property
owner even before that owner acquires legal title to the realty in
question. 2 Interestingly, the construction of the statute of limitation
governing damage to realty makes application of the statute of repose to
claims arising out of it unnecessary in every instance.
The court went on to hold that the fireplace was an "improvement"
within the meaning of the statute because it was an integral part of the

75. Id. at 648-49, 446 S.E.2d at 792. See Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National
Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 365, 368 S.E.2d 732, 732-33 (1988).

76. 213 Ga. App. at 651, 446 S.E.2d at 744. See Brian Morrissey & Matthew Wallace,
ConstructionLaw, 43 MERCER L. REV. 141, 147-48 (1991).

77. 213 Ga. App. at 649, 446 S.E.2d at 743. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 itself merely provides:
"All actions for trespass upon or damage to realty shall be brought within four years after
the right of action accrues." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 (1982) (emphasis added).
78. 213 Ga. App. at 650, 446 S.E.2d at 743.
79. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 which provides: "Actions for injuries to personalty shall be
brought within four years after the right of action accrues." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-32 (1982)

(emphasis added). The operative language is identical to that contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-330.
80. 213 Ga. App. at 652, 446 S.E.2d at 745. See supra note 71.
81. 213 Ga. App. at 651, 446 S.E.2d at 744.
82. Id.
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house, not a mere frill, and served as an alternate heat source of
economic and aesthetic value.8 3 A component on a construction project
"is an essential or integral part of the improvement to which it belongs,
[when] it is itself an improvement to real property."' Moreover, as the
fireplace itself was an improvement to real property, the date of
substantial completion was that date on which the fireplace, and not the
entire house, was completed. 5
The court of appeals was confronted with a slightly different issue in
Gwinnett Place Associates, L.P. v. Pharr Engineering, Inc."8 In that
case, Lillian Manley and her husband filed suit against Gwinnett Place
Associates, L.P., d/b/a Gwinnett Place Mall to recover damages for
injuries incurred when Lillian Manley fell on a ramp located outside one
of the mall restaurants. 7 Subsequently, Gwinnett Place Associates
filed a third party complaint against Pharr Engineering, the firm
responsible for designing and constructing the parking lot and curbs at
the mall; RTKL Associates, the architectural firm responsible for the
overall design of the mall, including ramps; and Hoar Construction, the
general contractor responsible for installation of the ramps. Summary
judgment was granted to the third party defendants from which appeal
was made."
The mall was substantially completed in February 1984, and the third
party complaint was not filed until September 24, 1993, more than eight
years after that date. Gwinnett Place contended that the statute of
repose did not apply to an action for indemnity.8" The court found that
because the underlying claims were dependent upon proof of damage to
person or property, the indemnity claim was equajly controlled by the
applicable statute of repose.9" Gwinnett Place further contended that
the exception to the eight-year statute of repose found within the
language of the statute itself"1 controlled because the original action

83. Id. at 652, 446 S.E.2d at 744.
84. Id. (quoting Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga 90, 94, 296 S.E.2d 579, 584

(1982)).
85. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 744-45.
86. 215 Ga. App. 53, 449 S.E.2d 889 (1994).

87.
88.
89.
90.
S.E.2d

Id. at 53, 449 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 53-54, 449 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 54, 449 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 55, 449 S.E.2d at 891. See, e.g., Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 441

868 (1994) (holding a similar statute of repose applicable to a contribution claim
arising out of a medical malpractice action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b)).
91. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(b) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, in the case of such an injury
to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which injury
occurred during the seventh or eighth year after such substantial completion, an
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was filed in a timely fashion even though the injury occurred in the
eighth year after substantial completion.92 The court rejected this
argument holding that the indemnity action did not relate back but
stood on its own filing date and, thus, was barred by the statute of
repose."
IV.

A.

TORT LIABILITY-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES AND FRAUD

Fraud

Lack of Justifiable Reliance. In one of the more puzzling aspects
of the decision in Cobb County School District v. MAT Factory, Inc.,"
the court of appeals held that there was no material issue of any
genuine fact as a matter of law with respect to whether Cobb County
School District in good faith justifiably relied upon representations made
by MAT Factory and its president concerning the testing on the
product.95 The court found that the test results were available to all
parties involved in the transaction before any contract was signed and
held that Cobb County School District was free to repeat the test where
and when it wanted, if it so desired, pursuant to any standard it
chose." Cobb County School District waited until September, 1992
reason
before it made any such test. The court of appeals suggests no 97
why the School District chose at that moment to perform a test.
In finding a lack of justifiable reliance as a matter of law, the court
held:
The law does not afford relief to one who suffers by not using the
ordinary means of information, whether the neglect is due to indifference or credulity. When the means of knowledge are at hand and

action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be
brought within two years after the date on which such injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be brought more than
ten years after the substantial completion of construction of such an improvement.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(b).
92. 215 Ga. App. at 55-56, 449 S.E.2d at 891.
93. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 891-92.
94. See supra note 45.
95. 215 Ga. App. at 701, 452 S.E.2d at 145.
96. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 144-45.
97. Id. at 700, 452 S.E.2d at 144. For example, if the School District had received
information after the fact concerning the falsity of information represented to it concerning
the performance of the product, its decision to test the product in September, 1992 makes
sense. Obviously, if the test was based on mere whimsy, the School District's position is
less sympathetic.
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equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike
open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these
means, he will not be heard to say, in impeachment of the contract of
sale, that he was deceived by the vendor's representations. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the trial court did not err in
concluding as a matter of law that plaintiffs failed to exercise proper
diligence in protecting themselves from defendant's alleged fraudulent
concealment.98
What is curious about this conclusion is the fact that the cases relied
upon for support of the legal proposition are land transaction cases
where historically a buyer is on notice of all that he can see, whereas
here the School District, a non-expert in the physical properties of this
particular product, was led to believe that certain test results showed
the product performed to certain qualities consistent with the School
Districts' requirements as set forth in the ANSI and ASTM specifications. If the court of appeals is serious in holding that as a matter of
law the School District could not have relied upon the information
furnished by the manufacturer's representatives, i.e., the distributors,
then it remains to be seen how far one must go in order to protect
oneself from exaggerated claims derived from testing done on any
product sold commercially. This uncertainty opens the door to a
potentially serious attack on rights of claimants in products liability
cases as well as all purchasers of products incorporated into construction
projects.
Representations made to third parties. In Maddox v. Southern
Engineering Co.,' 9 the fraud claim of plaintiff Gilbert Maddox against
defendant, Southern Engineering Company, Carroll County Water
Authority, and Still Waters Plantation Ltd., was dismissed because it
was premised upon representations made by the defendants to government officials in order to secure the location for the construction of a
dam and reservoir. As the representations were not made to the
plaintiff, they were not actionable as a fraud against him because he was
not misled in any way by any false representation allegedly made."°

98. Id. at 701,452 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Miller v. Clabby, 178 Ga. App. 821,823,344

S.E.2d 751 (1986)).
99. 216 Ga. App. 6, 453 S.E.2d 70 (1995).
100. Id. at 7, 453 S.E.2d at 72. This, of course, did not require dismissal of the
plaintiff's RICO claim which was based upon the statutory violation of making false
statements to a government agency and not the same fraud as was dismissed.
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V. MATERIALMAN'S LIENS

A.

Notice Requirements

Final Delivery of Materials. In ResurgensPlaza South Associates
v. Consolidated Electric Supply, Inc., ' Consolidated Electric Supply,
Inc., d/b/a B & W Electric Supply provided materials to DCG Electrical
Construction, the electrical contractor hired by the general contractor,
Summit Commercial Contractors, Incorporated, in the performance of
0 2 Invoices of Consolidated
interior finish work in Resurgens Plaza."
Electric Supply show an order was placed on October 10, 1990, for
certain polished brass wall fixtures which were delivered on December
10, 1990. DCG Electrical failed to pay for the materials and Consolidated Electric filed a lien against the property on February 19, 1991.
Judgment was entered against Resurgens Plaza which appealed from the
denial of its motions for directed verdict and judgment not withstanding
the verdict.' 3
Resurgens Plaza contended that the delivery on December 10, 1990
was not part of the original contract but a separate contract between
DCG Electrical and a tenant, and that Consolidated Electric failed 1°4
to
properly allocate its charges between the two separate agreements.
Resurgens Plaza offered the testimony of its property manager who
indicated that DCG Electrical requested two extra wall sconces after the
build out of the space had been completed. The lack of detail with
respect to identification of the particular materials involved and that
Consolidated Electric invoices showed the order had been placed in
October, rather than in November or December after the space was built
out, allowed the issue to proceed to a jury.105
In a strongly worded dissent, it was pointed out that the last delivery
of material DCG Electrical needed to complete its contract was on
October 23, 1990, more than three months before the lien was filed by
Consolidated Electric. There was no evidence to suggest a continuation
of the contractual relationship. Rather, the evidence suggested a new
relationship created by DCG's additional work to be performed for the
tenant.' °6 Moreover, the dissent was persuaded by the fact that a

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

215 Ga. App. 818, 452 S.E.2d 784 (1994).
Id. at 818, 452 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 818-19, 452 S.E.2d at 785-86.
Id. at 819, 452 S.E.2d at 786.
Id.
Id. at 820-21, 452 S.E.2d at 787.
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Certificate of Occupancy had issued on October 6, 1990 and that final
punchlist work was completed by the end of November, 1990.1°7 The
majority opinion, however, indicates that the issuance of a Certificate of
Substantial Completion, release of retainage, or other activity under the
construction contract does not bar a claim of lien.'
B. Requirement of ContractualRelationship
Ratification of Contract Creating Privity. In Underground
Festival, Inc. v. McAfee Engineering & Co.,' Underground Festival
was the lessor of certain space in Underground Atlanta in which DBA
of Atlanta, Incorporated was to open a restaurant and bar. The lease
was signed on behalf of DBA by its president while the outer shell of the
mall was being constructed. The lease with Underground Festival
required the interior space to be designed and built by DBA pursuant to
a construction allowance for improvements. The president of DBA
oversaw the design, construction and start up of the company, and
contracted with McAfee Engineering Company to design and install an
HVAC system and grease hoods in the space. McAfee Engineering,
incorrectly denominated DBA as F&K of Atlanta, Incorporated, because
DBA's architect had done so on blueprints. The error was unnoticed and
incorporated into the contract signed by the president of DBA. F&K of
Atlanta was a nonexistent entity. After the design and installation of
the equipment, when the invoice was not paid, McAfee Engineering filed
a claim of lien against Underground Festival. DBA subsequently filed
for bankruptcy protection naming McAfee Engineering as a creditor.
The court proceeded to trial and a verdict was returned in the amount
of $126,100 in favor of McAfee Engineering. Underground Festival
appealed from judgment." °
On appeal, Underground Festival contended McAfee Engineering was
not entitled to file a lien against the property because no contract
existed between it and Underground Festival or Underground Festival's
tenant, DBA." A lien may attach to real property when materials are
furnished at the insistence of the owner, contractor, or some other person
acting for the owner or contractor." 2 A lien requires a contractual

107.
108.
S.E.2d
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 821, 425 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 819, 452 S.E.2d at 786. See Sasser & Co. v. Griffin, 133 Ga. App. 83, 210
34 (1974).
214 Ga. App. 243, 447 S.E.2d 687 (1994).
Id. at 243, 447 S.E.2d at 684.
Id.
Id. at 243-44,447 S.E.2d at 684. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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relationship between the materialman and one contracting with the
owner in order to prevent a stranger from ordering work upon real
estate and charging the owner.11
The court found that DBA had ratified the contract signed by its
The corporation's conduct
president with McAfee Engineering."'
McAfee's invoices to
submitted
DBA
because
implied ratification
Underground Festival for payment from its construction allowance, and
the officers of DBA wrote to Underground Festival acknowledging that
DBA owed the debt to McAfee Engineering. Although the contract
executed by the president of DBA mistakenly mentioned a different
nonexistent corporation, it was clear from the evidence that the
president intended to act on behalf of DBA when he entered into the
contract, and, therefore, DBA had complete authority to ratify the
agreement."1 5 The court held:
"Where a corporation knowing all of the facts accepts and uses the
proceeds of an unauthorized contract executed in its behalf without
authority, the corporation may be bound because of ratification .... "
If this is true where the contract is unauthorized and the corporation
seeks to avoid responsibility, it is certainly so when the contract was
in fact authorized, the corporation does not deny that it ratified the
contract, but another name was mistakenly placed on the contract by
the materialman."'
C.

Fulfillment of Conditions Precedent

Commencement of Action Against Contractor. In order to create
and enforce a lien against an owner, a subcontractor must first
commence an action against the defaulting contractor or recover the
amount of its claim within twelve months." 7 In UndergroundFestival,
Underground Festival contended that McAfee Engineering failed to
fulfill this condition precedent by not commencing an action against DBA
prior to its lien foreclosure action. The court concluded, however, that

113. 214 Ga. App. at 243, 447 S.E.2d at 684. See D&N Elec. v. Underground Festival,
202 Ga. App. 435, 414 S.E.2d 891 (1992).
114. 214 Ga. App. at 244, 447 S.E.2d at 684. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6-52 ( 1994).
115. 214 Ga. App. at 244, 447 S.E,2d at 684-85. The dissent mistakenly applied
Broyles v. Kirkwood Court Apts., 97 Ga. App. 384, 103 S.E.2d 97 (1958), for the proposition
that the corporation did not have authority to ratify the contract as it was not done with
its authority, overlooking the fact that the president intended to bind DBA when he
entered into the contract and was acting solely on its behalf. 214 Ga. App. at 248, 447
S.E.2d at 687 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
116. 214 Ga. App. at 244-45, 447 S.E.2d at 685 (emphasis in original).
117. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3) (Supp. 1995).
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a subcontractor is relieved from the requirement to commence an action8
against the contractor in instances where the contractor is bankrupt."
Moreover, a contractor is not required to refrain from commencing an
action against a bankrupt creditor as it may file a claim in bankruptcy
within the appropriate time period. By doing so, the contractor has
"commenced an action" within the meaning of the lien statute." 9 By
filing a claim in the bankruptcy action, McAfee Engineering commenced
an action within the twelve months, even though it was relieved of the
responsibility to do so.120

VI.
A.

SURETY BOND AND GUARANTOR ISSUES

Public Works Bonds

Who May Assert Claim. In 1992, the court of appeals rejected any
narrow definition of "subcontractor" in considering standing to assert
claims on payment bonds under Georgia's Little Miller Act (the
"Act"). 2 ' The court rejected the argument that the Act should be
construed as limiting coverage in the same way that federal courts had
under the Federal Miller Act.'22 In Barton Malow Company v. Metro
Manufacturing, Inc.,123 the court of appeals was able to revisit this
question, again broadening the scope of coverage under the Act. 24
Barton Malow Company was hired by DeKalb County to construct a
filter plant expansion. Barton Malow posted a payment bond using
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company as its surety. The contract required
prefabricated carbon steel pipe and accessories for which Barton Malow
contracted with Progressive Fabricators.
Progressive Fabricators
contracted with the plaintiff, Metro Manufacturing, to furnish some of

118. 214 Ga. App. at 245, 447 S.E.2d at 685. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(aX4) which
provides that a contractor "may enforce the lien directly against the property so improved
in an action against the owner thereof, if filed within 12 months from the time the lien
becomes due...." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(4) (Supp. 1995).
119. 214 Ga. App. at 245, 447 S.E.2d at 685. See Melton v. Pacific S. Mtg. Trust, 241
Ga. 589, 247 S.E.2d 76 (1978).
120. 214 Ga. App. at 245, 447 S.E.2d at 685.
121. See Tom Barrow Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 205 Ga. App. 10, 421
S.E.2d 85 (1992).
122. Id. at 11, 421 S.E.2d at 87. See Clifford F. McAvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S.
102 (1944).
123. 214 Ga. App. 56, 446 S.E.2d 785 (1994).
124. Id. at 56, 446 S.E.2d at 786. The term "subcontractor" under the Act is defined
as one "supplying labor, materials, machinery, and equipment in the prosecution of the
work provided for in the contract... " O.C.G.A. § 1.3-10-1(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
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the items, all of which were in fact delivered to the project site.
Progressive Fabricators then filed for bankruptcy without paying for
these items and suit was brought for recovery under the payment bond.
Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff. The defendant
contractor and its surety appealed.'
The contractor and its surety argued the plaintiff was too remote as
a mere supplier to a supplier to recover under the bond. The court of
appeals, in rejecting this argument, reiterated the broad definition of
"subcontractor" adopted in 1992. The Court found that the plaintiff was
merely a supplier of materials to another supplier of materials. This
reasoning did not distinguish it from the plaintiff in Tom Barrow Co. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'26 In Tom Barrow, the claimant
provided services, not simply materials, to another supplier of materials,
but the court of appeals found this to be a meaningless distinction. 27
The net effect of this holding is, as the dissent suggests, as follows:
W]nless the majority's holding today is somehow narrowed in scope in
future cases, it would appear that "all persons supplying labor,
materials, machinery, and equipment in the prosecution of the work
provided for in the contract" will be "subcontractors," regardless of
whether they are in privity of contract with the prime contractor.
[citations omitted]. This will mean that any language in the Little
Miller Act implying a contrary result is mere surplusage.'2
The case probably does mean the end of any direct privity requirement
in order to assert a claim under the Act.
Notice of Claim. In Devore & Johnson, Inc. v. Bowen & Watson,
Inc.,129 Bowen & Watson was the general contractor for the construction of elementary school facilities in Habersham County. In order to
obtain the contract, Bowen & Watson provided Employer's Insurance of
Wausau as its surety. Cody Mechanical Company was hired by Bowen
& Watson as a subcontractor, and Devore & Johnson supplied the
electrical plumbing supplies to Cody Mechanical that were used in

125. 214 Ga. App. at 56, 446 S.E.2d at 786.
126. Id. at 56-57, 446 S.E.2d at 786-87. See supra note 121.
127. 214 Ga. App. at 57, 446 S.E.2d at 787.
128. Id. at 58, 446 S.E.2d at 788. The Little Miller Act itself states: "As used in this
article, the term.. . 'Subcontractor' includes but is not limited to those having privity of
contract with the prime contractor." O.C.G.A. § 36-82-100(2) (1993) (emphasis added); see
also O.C.G.A. § 13-10-2(a)(5) which defines "subcontractor" as "a person other than an
owner having a direct contract with the contractor." O.C.G.A. § 13-10-2(a)(5) (Supp. 1995)
(emphasis added).
129. 216 Ga. App. 63, 453 S.E.2d 67 (1995).
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connection with the project. Cody Mechanical failed to pay for the
materials, and a lawsuit was filed on the payment bond. Summary
judgment was granted to Bowen & Watson and its surety from which the
plaintiff, Devore & Johnson, appealed. 3 0
On February 24, 1993, upon inquiry from Bowen & Watson concerning
certain invoices that Cody Mechanical had prematurely submitted to the
contractor for payment, Devore & Johnson informed Bowen & Watson
that Cody Mechanical had not been current in making payments on past
invoices. Bowen & Watson requested a list of unpaid invoices for other
projects due from Cody Mechanical. Devore & Johnson sent a certified
letter dated March 16, 1993, to Bowen & Watson advising the company
of the remaining past due balances owed by Cody Mechanical on three
separate projects involving Bowen & Watson. 3' The letter stated:
[w]e have worked closely with Phillip Cody in an effort to bring these
accounts to a current basis. We regret the necessity of informing
Bowen & Watson Construction Company but obviously, the size of the
account has a definite affect on our own financial structure. The
situation has become progressively worse in recent months. We would
like very much to meet with both you and Philip in an effort to reach
a satisfactory solution.132
33
Cody Mechanical subsequently filed for liquidation in bankruptcy.

The court held that the letter sent to Bowen & Watson, including the
name of the party to whom the materials were furnished and computations of outstanding balances on several projects, constituted notice
under the Georgia Little Miller Act despite the fact the letter did not
specify that it was sent for the purpose of providing Bowen & Watson
with notice pursuant to the statute. 3 4 The liberal construction

130.

Id. at 63, 453 S.E.2d at 68.

131. Id.
132. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 68-69.
133.

Id., 453 S.E.2d at 69.

134. Id. at 64, 453 S.E.2d at 69. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-104(b)(2) provides:
Any person having direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor, but no
contractual relationship express or implied with the contractor furnishing such
payment bond or security deposit on a public work where the contractor has
complied with the Notice of Commencement requirements in accordance with
subsection (f) of this Code section, shall have the right of action on the payment
bond or security deposit, provided such person shall, within 30 days from the filing

of the Notice of Commencement or 30 days following the first delivery of labor,
material, machinery, or equipment, whichever is later, give to the contractor a
written Notice to Contractor setting forth:
(A) The name, address, and telephone number of the person providing labor,
material, machinery, or equipment;
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accorded the Little Miller Act due to its remedial nature135 allowed the
court to conclude that the intent of the letter was to inform the
contractor that the supplier was looking to the contractor for payment
of the subcontractor's bill, and, therefore, proper notice of claim had been
made within the time period36 required of a subcontractor not in direct
privity with the contractor.'
B. Sureties
Breach of Completion Contract. While Amwest Surety Insurance
Co. v. RA-LIN & Associates, Inc." 7 involves a public works bond, the
issues involved in that case pertain to general surety law. Amwest
Surety Insurance Company brought suit against RA-LIN & Associates
and RA-LIN's insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company,
alleging that RA-LIN refused to proceed with completion of a construction project for low income housing owned by the Housing Authority of
the City of Granville, Georgia.'3 8 Amwest was the surety on payment
and performance bonds offered on the project to Dennis Welding
Construction Company, the original contractor on the project. Dennis
Welding Construction defaulted, and the Housing Authority called on
Amwest Surety to complete performance. 3 9 Amwest Surety 4 determined to rebid the project for completion by another contractor. 1 0
Rebid documents were prepared by Surety and Construction Consultants, Incorporated, which had performed a survey of the project to
determine the scope of what was left to be done. Five potential bidders
were mailed bid packages, and on May 28, 1991, Surety and Construction Consultants held a prebid conference to discuss the bid documents
with the potential bidders. Surety and Construction Consultants
understood that the Housing Authority would not accept a completion

(B) The name and address of each person at whose instance the labor, material,
machinery, or equipment is being furnished;
(C) The name and the location of the public work; and
(D) A description of the labor, material, machinery, or equipment being provided
and, if known, the contract price or anticipated value of the labor, material,
machinery, or equipment to be provided or the amount claimed to be due, if any.
O.C.G.A. § 36-82-104(b)(2) (1993).
135. See Huddleston Concrete Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 186 Ga. App. 531,534, 368
S.E.2d 117, 120 (1988).
136. 216 Ga. App. at 64, 453 S.E.2d at 69.
137. 216 Ga. App. 526, 455 S.E.2d 106 (1995).
138. Id. at 526-27, 455 S.E.2d at 107.
139. Id. at 527, 455 S.E.2d at 107.
140. Id.
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contract if the Housing Authority were named as a party in the contract.
A question was asked at the conference by RA-LIN concerning the
identity of the other contracting party to the completion contract. Due
to an ongoing lawsuit between Amwest and RA-LIN in an unrelated
matter, RA-LIN preferred to contract directly with the Housing
Authority and not Amwest Surety. Surety and Construction Consultants
told RA-LIN that the successful bidder would contract directly with the
Housing Authority.141
The "Invitation to Bid" contained in part the following two provisions
relating to time:
The successful bidder will be notified no later than five (5) days after
the bid opening and will be expected to immediately enter into the
construction contract. The successful bidder will only begin operations
upon receipt of a notice to proceed. The notice to proceed will set the
date at which the contract time will commence ....

All bids will be

regarded
as valid and in full force for 60 calendar days after receipt of
142
bids.

The contract also contained language above the bidder's signature
language indicating that the bid would remain valid and available for
acceptance sixty calendar days from the bid date. The "scope of work"
terms provided that the successful bidder would be completing a contract
for Amwest Surety and the Housing Authority. The proposed form of
agreement contained in the bid documents indicated that the form of
agreement was that which Amwest Surety and the Housing Authority
anticipated entering with the successful bidder.143 The instructions
also indicated that the successful bidder could be required to enter into
a contract with either Amwest Surety or with the Housing Authority
alone. But, in either case, the form of agreement itself would not be
grounds for the completion contractor to refuse to enter into a contract
as long as the actual completion contract used conformed to the form
agreement. The suggested form agreement named14Amwest
Surety and
4
the completion contractor as the only parties to

it.

Only two bids were submitted on the project and on June 4, 1991, it
was determined that RA-LIN's bid was the lowest. RA-LIN's bid was
accepted by Amwest Surety and on June 7, 1991, a draft completion
agreement was provided to RA-LIN which RA-LIN did not execute and
did not return. RA-LIN advised Surety and Safety Consultants that RALIN was not willing to enter into a contract directly with Amwest Surety
141.

Id. at 528, 455 S.E.2d at 107.

142. Id., 455 S.E.2d at 108.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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but would deal directly with the Housing Authority. 45 Summary
judgment was entered in favor of RA-LIN because no contract resulted
due to the conduct of Amwest Surety. Amwest Surety appealed.146
Amwest Surety contended that it had sixty days within which to
accept the bid because the contract provided that the bid remain open
for that period of time; however, the bid instructions also indicated that
Amwest Surety had to accept the bid within five days of opening.
Amwest Surety did not accept within the requisite time period.' 47
Accordingly, RA-LIN's bid was revocable before acceptance as no
consideration was offered to keep it open the entire sixty day period.148
The trial court found the invitation to bidders ambiguous in this regard
and construed it strictly against the drafter, Amwest Surety. 4 9
Amwest Surety also contended that a binding contract was formed
within five days when its agent transmitted a proposed completion
contract to RA-LIN, but the court of appeals concluded no contract was
entered between the parties by that date and the transmission did not
bind RA-LIN.' 50 As the parties did not have a meeting of the minds
concerning the essential elements to the contract, including who the
signatory would be, no contract was formed or enforceable. 151
VII.

A

ARBITRATION

Compelling Arbitrationand Staying Judicial Proceedings
Grant of Application to Compel Arbitration Not Directly

Appealable.

In Pace Construction Corp. v. Northpark Associates,

L.P,52 Northpark Associates brought a breach of contract action
against Pace Construction Corporation, H. J. Russell Construction
Company, Henry C. Beck Company, Transamerica Insurance Company,
and Seaboard Surety Company requesting that the court compel
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the parties' contract. Northpark
Associates filed a motion to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration.
While Pace Construction, Henry C. Beck Company, Transamerica
Insurance Company and Seaboard Surety filed motions to stay arbitra-

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 528-29, 455 S.E.2d at 108.
Id. at 529, 455 S.E.2d at 108-09.
Id. at 529-31, 455 S.E.2d at 108-10.
Id. at 530, 455 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 531, 455 S.E.2d at 110.
Id. at 530, 455 S.E.2d at 109.
Id.
215 Ga. App. 438, 450 S.E.2d 828 (1994).
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tion, H. J. Russell Construction filed a motion to dismiss the action, and
Pace Construction Company filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The motion to stay judicial proceedings was
granted153 and all other motions denied, from which appeals were
taken.

The court overruled Bartlett v. Dimension Designs,"' which had
stated that an order directing arbitration was directly appealable.'5 5
The court held that an appeal could only be brought under the rules
governing interlocutory appeals and, because those procedures were not
followed, the appeals were properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 156
Even so, it is not required that an interlocutory appeal be made, as the
court of appeals held in Bishop ContractingCo., v. Center Bros., Inc.'5 7
In that case, the general contractor's attempt to stay proceedings and
enforce an arbitration clause was denied. Subsequent to the entry of
judgment in favor of a subcontractor for the collection of extra work
orders, the general contractor appealed.158 While the Georgia Supreme
Court has determined that motions pertaining to pending arbitration
may have significant consequences and has recommended that trial
courts certify such orders for immediate appeal under interlocutory
procedures, this decision did not require that an aggrieved party make
an interlocutory appeal or risk waiving the issue. 5 9
Claims Barred by Res Judicata. In Centex-Rodgers Construction
Co. v. City of Roswell, 6 ' Centex-Rodgers contracted with the City of
Roswell for the construction of a municipal complex. McCann Steel
Company was a subcontractor for structural steel work. Centex-Rodgers
sued McCann for delay damages caused by problems with the structural
steel, and McCann counterclaimed for delay damages and additional
costs related
to defective plans prepared by the City of Roswell's
161
architects.

McCann Steel Company moved to enforce the arbitration clause. The
trial court ordered Centex-Rodgers to file a demand for arbitration for
the use and benefit of McCann Steel Company against the City of

153. Id. at 438-39, 450 S.E.2d at 828.
154. 195 Ga. App. 845,395 S.E.2d 64 (1990), overruledby, 215 Ga. App. 438,450 S.E.2d
828 (1994).
155. 215 Ga. App. at 439, 450 S.E.2d at 829. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(4) (1995).
156. 215 Ga. App. at 439-40, 450 S.E.2d at 829.
157. 213 Ga. App. 804, 445 S.E.2d 780 (1994).
158. Id. at 804, 455 S.E.2d at 781.
159. Id. at 805-06, 445 S.E.2d at 782.
160. 215 Ga. App. 30, 449 S.E.2d 631 (1994).
161. Id. at 30, 449 S.E.2d at 632.
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Roswell and to assist McCann Steel in good faith in its presentation of
the pass-through claim. Centex-Rodgers filed a demand for arbitration
against the City of Roswell as instructed.162
One year before, Centex-Rodgers had filed a demand for arbitration
against the City of Roswell, including claims on its own behalf as well
as those on behalf of other subcontractors, but excluding McCann Steel
Company. The earlier demand did not include any claim by CentexRodgers for delay damages against the City of Roswell. On December
6, 1991, the arbitration panel awarded damages to Centex-Rodgers and
three of its subcontractors, which the City of Roswell paid. 6 '
After Centex-Rodgers filed its second demand for arbitration for the
use and benefit of McCann Steel Company as instructed by the court, in
February, 1992 the City of Roswell filed an action seeking to enjoin that
arbitration. On September 24, 1992, the trial court granted CentexRodgers' motion to compel arbitration and required that all remaining
issues be arbitrated, including the City of Roswell's claim of waiver.
Centex-Rodgers
did not fie any claims in the pending arbitration on its
164
own behalf.

The arbitrator determined that Centex-Rodgers' right to arbitrate had
not been waived and that the pass-through claim of McCann Steel for
extra work and delay could proceed. On September 21, 1993, the
arbitrator entered a consent order adopting a settlement agreement
entered between McCann Steel and the City of Roswell which provided
that the City of Roswell would pay McCann Steel eighty-thousand
dollars and that the City of Roswell would issue to Centex-Rodgers, for
the use and benefit of McCann Steel, a time extension of 150 days.'65
The City of Roswell and McCann Steel filed motions in their respective
superior court actions to confirm the arbitrator's award. Subsequently,
Centex-Rodgers filed motions to compel further arbitration, contending
that the settlement agreement created a new cause of action for CentexRodgers because of the City's admission of its liability for delay. The
trial court determined that Centex-Rodgers' claims were barred by the
doctrine of res judicata from which appeal was taken.'66
The court held that all of the facts constituting Centex-Rodgers' cause
of action for delay against the City of Roswell or McCann Steel Company
existed, at the latest, by the completion of the construction of the
complex. Centex-Rodgers sought to use the settlement agreement

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 30-31, 449 S.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 31, 449 S.E.2d at 632.
Id.
Id., 449 S.E.2d at 632-33.
Id., 449 S.E.2d at 633.
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between the City of Roswell and McCann Steel to establish the City of
Roswell's liability for those delay damages; 7 however, an admission
of liability does not in and of itself create a cause of action but is merely
evidence in the existing cause of action.168 By not filing its delay claim
against the City of Roswell pursuant to the trial court's order of
September 24, 1992, Centex-Rogers was precluded from bringing it in a
Moreover, the settlement agreement
subsequent arbitration. 169
between the City of Roswell and McCann Steel, to which Centex-Rodgers
was a pass-through party, affected Centex-Rodgers' rights as a participant, even though it chose not to present its own claims against McCann
Steel in that arbitration.7 0 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed
that all claims of Centex-Rodgers were barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.' 7 '
B.

ProcedureUnder the Arbitration Code

Discovery Not Permitted in Confirmation Proceeding. In
Fuller Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardin Construction Group, Inc.,72 Fuller
Enterprises appealed from the trial court's ruling denying its motion for
protective order in an arbitration confirmation proceeding against
Hardin Construction Group. Fuller had been awarded damages in an
arbitration proceeding and had filed an application for confirmation of
the award in the superior court. Hardin Construction filed an answer
defenses and served discovery requests upon Fuller
with affirmative
173
Enterprises.

The court of appeals reasoned by way of analogy that an arbitration
confirmation proceeding is similar to a foreclosure confirmation
proceeding.174 The supreme court had previously held that foreclosure
confirmations were not civil suits within the ordinary meaning of that
term under the Civil Practice Act.'75 The court of appeals noted that
the arbitration code provided that an application for confirmation of an
award would be made by motion and would be heard in the manner
provided by law and the rules of court concerning the making of motions,

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 32, 449 S.E.2d at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id.

172.

215 Ga. App. 549, 451 S.E.2d 483 (1994).

Id.

173. Id. at 549, 451 S.E.2d at 483.
174. Id. at 550, 451 S.E.2d at 484.
175. Id. at 549-50,451 S.E.2d at 483-84. See Vlass v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 263 Ga.
296, 430 S.E.2d 732 (1993).
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even though the motion would be filed and served in the same manner
as a complaint in a civil action.' 76 The court further held that while
an arbitration award confirmation proceeding is a special statutory
proceeding, it is not a civil suit in the ordinary meaning of that term but
in the nature of a summary proceeding.' 77 Allowing discovery prior to
a trial court's consideration of a motion in the summary proceeding
would serve only to delay a prompt disposal of the confirmation as the
code envisioned. 7 '
Defective Notice Not Prejudicial. In Goodrich v. Southland
Homes Corp.,"' Goodrich appealed from a trial court's confirmation of
an arbitration award against her in an action initiated by Southland
Homes Corporation. Goodrich contended in part that the trial court's
confirmation of the award was improper because the demand for
arbitration had failed to notify Goodrich of a right to seek a stay of
arbitration as required by O.C.G.A. section 9-9-6(c)(3).lm An award
may be vacated if the court finds that the rights of a party were
prejudiced by the failure of any other party to follow the procedures of
the arbitration code, unless the party continues with the proceeding
While Goodrich
without notice of the failure and without objection.'
had notice of the arbitration proceeding, she participated in the
proceeding without objection, and therefore, no harm resulted to her

176. 215 Ga. App. at 550,451 S.E.2d at 484. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(a)(2) which provides:
"All applications shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner provided by law and
rule of court for the making or hearing of motions, provided that the motion shall be filed
in the same manner as a complaint in a civil action." O.C.G.A. 9-9-4(aX2) (Supp. 1995).
177. 215 Ga. App. at 550, 451 S.E.2d at 484.
178. Id. at 550, 451 S.E.2d at 484.
179. 214 Ga. App. 790, 449 S.E.2d 154 (1994).
180. Id. at 790-92, 449 S.E.2d at 155-56. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(c)(3) provides as follows:
A party may serve upon another party a demand for arbitration. This demand
shall specify: ... (3) That the party served with a demand shall be precluded
from denying the validity of the agreement or compliance therewith or from
asserting limitation of time as a bar in court unless he makes application to the
court within 30 days for an order to stay arbitration ....
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(c)(3) (Supp. 1995).
181. 214 Ga. App. at 792, 449 S.E.2d at 156. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(4) provides as
follows:
(b) The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either
participated in the arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the
court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: . . . (4) A failure to
follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the award
continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(bX4) (Supp. 1995).
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from her failure to make an application for an order to stay arbitration,
and, without prejudice, confirmation of the award was proper.182

C. Scope of Arbitrator'sAuthority
Disputes Outside the Scope of Construction Contract. In
Goodrich, Goodrich also contended that the scope of the agreement to
arbitrate limited the scope of the arbitrator's powers to construction
disputes alone under the construction agreement."s The arbitration
code limits the powers of arbitrators to those disputes which the parties
have agreed in writing to arbitrate." 4 The arbitrator then was
without authority to arbitrate any issue relating to the conveyance of
property, but could arbitrate those disputes arising out of the construction contract.' 85

182. 214 Ga. App. at 792, 449 S.E.2d at 156.
183 Id. at 790-91, 449 S.E.2d at 155.
184. Id, See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) which states:
(c) This part shall apply to all disputes in which the parties thereto have agreed
in writing to arbitrate and shall provide the exclusive means by which agreements
to arbitrate disputes can be enforced, except the following, to which this part shall
not apply:
(1) Agreements coming within the purview of Article 2 of this chapter, relating to
arbitration of medical malpractice claims;
(2) Any collective bargaining agreements between employers and labor unions
representing employees of such employers;
(3) Any contract of insurance, as defined in paragraph (1) of Code Section 33-1-2;
(4) Any other subject matters currently covered by an arbitration statute;
(5) Any loan agreement or consumer financing agreement in which the amount of
indebtedness is $25,000.00 or less at the time of execution;
(6) Any contract for the purchase of consumer goods, as defined in Title 11, the
"Uniform Commercial Code," under subsection (1) of Code Section 11-2-105 and
subsection (1) of Code Section 11-9-109;
(7) Any contract involving consumer acts or practices or involving consumer
transactions as such terms are defined in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a)
of Code Section 10-1-392, relating to definitions in the "Fair Business Practices Act
of 1975";
(8) Any sales agreement or loan agreement for the purchase or financing of
residential real estate unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate is initialed by all
signatories at the time of the execution of the agreement. This exception shall not
restrict agreements between or among real estate brokers or agents;
(9) Any contract relating to terms and conditions of employment unless the clause
agreeing to arbitrate is initialed by all signatories at the time of the execution of
the agreement;
(10) Any agreement to arbitrate future claims arising out of personal bodily injury
or wrongful death based on tort.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (Supp. 1995).
185. 214 Ga. App. at 791, 449 S.E.2d at 155.
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Avoiding Contractual Terms. In Amerispec Franchise v.
Cross, 8 ' Amerispec Franchise sought to vacate an arbitration award
under the arbitration code." 7 Amerispec Franchise contracted to
perform a home inspection on behalf of the Crosses."s The agreement
contained an arbitration clause and a limit of liability clause which
provided as follows: "[Q]ur liability to you is limited to the fee paid for
services and you release us from any additional liabiliour inspection
9
ty."

18

The arbitrator awarded the Crosses $25,888 plus interest to accrue
after thirty days at eight percent annually. The superior court vacated
the award and ordered a rehearing, but only on the issue of the rate of
interest established by the arbitrator. Amerispec Franchise argued on
appeal that the arbitrator either erred in his interpretation of the
agreement or in allowing the Crosses to rescind the inspection agreement and sue for fraud in the inducement. The superior court found
that the award reflected that the limitation of liability clause was
deemed void by the arbitrator and concluded the arbitrator did not
overstep his authority in doing so.' 9°
Both parties indicated that the arbitrator most likely applied O.C.G.A.
section 13-8-2(b) to their agreement rendering the limitation of liability
clause void.19' The court of appeals found that the arbitrator's determination on this question was not so clearly erroneous that it implicated
"the very integrity of the arbitrator in the exercise of his authority."'92
An arbitrator's decision must be upheld unless it is completely irrational
or constitutes a manifest disregard of the law. 93 The application of
the exculpatory clause of limitation found in O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b)
had not been previously addressed in a reported decision at the time the
arbitrator made the award; therefore, by voiding the limitation of

186. 215 Ga. App. 669, 452 S.E.2d 188 (1994).
187. Id. at 669, 452 S.E.2d at 189. Even though it was Amerispec Franchise which
sought to vacate the award, and the award was in fact vacated, Amerispec Franchise was
still the appellant before the court of appeals due to the limited nature of the vacation of
the award.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 669-70, 452 S.E.2d at 189-90.
191. Id. at 670, 454 S.E.2d at 190. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) provides in pertinent part that
certain exculpatory clauses in agreements are unenforceable "relative to the construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances."
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (1982 & Supp. 1995).
192. 215 Ga. App. at 671, 452 S.E.2d at 190.
193. Id. (quoting Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, 195 Ga. App. 845, 848, 395 S.E.2d 64
(1990)).
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liability clause, the arbitrator had not necessarily overstepped his
authority."'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The survey period showed a broadening of the rights of bond claimants
under Georgia's Little Miller Act and the imposition of obligations upon
purchasers of construction-related products to go behind test results
offered as proof of performance characteristics of those products. Both
changes could have far-reaching ramifications to construction claimants,
and it will be interesting to see whether the appellate courts devise any
limitations upon the rights and obligations that seemingly have been
created.

194. Id.

